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Health Expenditures and Precautionary Savings
ABSTRACT
The precautionary motive for saving is an important issue that is
receiving increasing attention. Part of the motivation for this interest
stems from the post war coincidence of two trends, one a decline in the U.S.
rate of saving and the other an increase in insurance of various types,
including unemployment insurance, annuity insurance, disability insurance, and
health insurance. This paper examines precautionary saving for uncertain
health care payments using a simple two period and illustrates this model's
theoretical insights through simulations of a 55 period life cycle model.
While derived from a highly stylized model, the simulations give the
impression that precautionary saving for uncertain health expenditures could
explain a large amount of aggregate savings. Adding uncertain health
expenditures to the model's economy raises long run savings by almost one
third, assuming individuals self insure. Arrangements for insuring uncertain
health expenditures also have potentially quite sizable effects on savings.
Introducing actuarially fair insurance to the economy with uncertain health
expenditures reduces the steady state level of wealth of that economy by 12
percent. Switching from the fair insurance arrangement to a Medicaid-type
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1. Introduction
The precautionary motive for saving is an important issue that is
receiving increasing attention. Part of the motivation for this interest
stems from the post war coincidence of two trends, one a decline in the U.S.
rate of saving and the other an increase in insurance of various types,
including unemployment insurance, annuity insurance, disability insurance, and
health insurance. The post war decline in the ratio of U.S. net national
product less total U.S. consumption to net national product is quite striking.
This ratio averaged 8.8 percent in the 1950s, 8.7 percent in the 1960s, 7.7
percent in the 1970s, but only 5.]. percent since 1980, with values of 3.2
percent, 5.8 percent and 4.4 percent in the non recession years of 1983, 1984,
and 1985, respectively.Over this period the provision of insurance,
particularly by the government increased enormously. The Social Security
System, including Medicare, now represents the nation's primary source of
insurance for length of life, disability, and old age health expenditures.
Given these two trends, a natural question to pose is whether improvements in
the provision of insurance reduced the demand for precautionary savings and
explain the decline in the U.S. saving rate.
In recent years economists have examined precautionary saving arising
from lifespan uncertainty and earnings uncertainty. Less attention has been
paid to precautionary saving to meet uncertain, uninsured health expenditures.
The lack of research on this topic may reflect the difficulty of precisely
quantifying the economic risks of morbidity. Unlike the case of lifespan
uncertainty for which there are published mortality tables that can be easily-2-
incorporated in the analysis, there are no corresponding tables specifying the
probabilities of particular levels of health expenditures by characteristics
such as age and sex. In addition, unlike certain causes of death, such as
being hit by a car, the causes of morbidity and health expenditures are not
likely to be independent from one year to the next. What one would really
like to have are probabilities of health expenditures conditional on past
health expenditures.
An additional problem involved in realistically studying saving for
uninsured health expenditures is grappling with the wide array of insurance
policies purchased by the public. Many of these policies are employer-
provided and are not subject to choice by the employee. Empirical analysis
of household saving in response to health expenditure uncertainty requires
knowledge of the specific medical insurance policies held by households.
Unfortunately, there do not appear to be available any micro data sets that
detail type of health insurance coverage together with information about
consumption and saving.
This paper abandons the difficult goal of attempting to model
realistically uncertainty with respect to health expenditures, and pursues
the simpler task of heuristically considering the question of precautionary
saving to meet uncertain health care payments. The heuristic analysis here
includes examining theoretical issues in a simple two period model as well as
illustrating the theoretical points with simulations of a 55 period life cycle
model. Several different insurance settings are examined. These are no
insurance, actuarially fair insurance, actuarially unfair insurance, and
incomplete insurance provided through a government program somewhat similar to-3-
the U.S. Medicaid system. Another option that individuals may elect is
simply not to receive medical care. While this latter option eliminates the
precautionary motive for saving, it also eliminates consumption of health care
services. Hence, an economy choosing not to pay for health caremay end up
with a level of savings similar to that of an economy with significant health
expenditures and a significant precautionary saving motive.
The next section discusses briefly some evidence concerning the size of
uninsured health expenditures. Section 3 looks at precautionary saving for
health expenditures and the affect of insurance arrangements on such saving
in a simple two period model. Section 4 uses a 55 period simulation model to
illustrate how health insurance arrangements can affect the economy's long run
level of savings. The concluding section points out that uncertainty with
respect to health expenditures may interact with uncertainty concerning
earnings and length of life in influencing precautionary savings and that this
interaction merits additional research.
The simulation analysis of Section 4 is conducted in partial equilibrium
since it takes factor prices (wages and interest rates) as given. Partial
equilibrium exercises of the kind conducted are likely to overstate the
corresponding general equilibrium results (Kotlikoff, 1979). Even so, the
simulations give one the impression that precautionary savings for uncertain
health expenditures could explain a fairly large amount of aggregate savings.
Adding uncertain health expenditures to the base case economy raises long run
savings by almost one third, assuming individuals self insure. The insurance
arrangements available for dealing with uncertain health expenditures also
have potentially quite sizable effects on savings. Introducing actuarially—4—
fair insurance to the economy with uncertain health expenditures reduces the
steady state level of wealth by 12 percent. Switching from the fair insurance
arrangement to a Medicaid-type program with an asset test further reduces
steady state wealth by 75 percent.
2. The Size of Uninsured Medical Expenditures
In a recent study of uninsured, non nursing home, health expenditures
Rossiter and Wilensky (1982) report quite modest average levels of uninsured
health expenditures. Their data come from the 1977-1978 National Medical
Care Expenditure Survey of about 14,000 households. Three quarters of the
U.S. population had some out-of-pocket expenses for health services in 1977.
The per capita level of such expenses was $275. This figure and all
subsequent dollar figures in this Section are expressed in 1985 dollars.
Amoung persons with positive expenditures expenses averaged $364. Average
uninsured health expenditures obviously depend importantly on age. For the 83
percent of those 65 and older with positive expenditures, expenditures
averaged $579 per person.
Most participants in the survey report quite small out-of-pocket health
expenditures. Almost 65 percent of surveyed individuals report either no
uninsured health expenditures or expenditures totalling less than $177 (100
1977 dollars). There are, however, some respondents for whom these
expenditures are more significant. The percentage of individuals with 1977
expenditures above $888 (500 1977 dollars) is 6.6 percent; the percentage
above $1775 (1000 1977 dollars) is 2.3 percent. For elderly individuals the—5—
percentage with non insured expenditures above $888 is 12.5 percent, while the
percentage with non-insured expenditures above $1775 is 4.9 percent. For 70
percent of surveyed individuals out-of-pocket expenditures represent less than
3 percent of income; they represent 20 percent or more of income for 4.2
percent of surveyed individuals.
Unfortunately, no more detailed information concerning expenditures in
excess of $1775 is provided in the study. Hence, one can not assess the
extent of extremely large uninsured health expenditures. It could well be
that a quite small fraction of the population incurs extremely large uninsured
expenses. A variety of studies documenting the high cost of particular
illnesses and particular health episodes are suggestive of this possibility.
For example, Long et. al. (1984) report that terminal cancer patients averaged
$21,219 in Blue Cross and Blue Shield reimbursed expenditures in their
terminal year. Lubitz and Prihoda (1984) show that for 6 percent of 1978
decedents enrolled in Medicare, Medicare expenses exceeded over $15,000.
Another consideration in viewing the Rossiter and Wilensky findings is
that they only describe uninsured expenditures over a short period of time,
and do not indicate the cumulative uninsured health expenditures of a
prolonged illness, such as cancer. Their data also do not include nursing
home expenditures. For private pay patients the cost of a year in a
reasonably nice nursing home currently appears to range between $25,000 to
$50,000. Obviously, nicer nursing homes can be even more expensive.
An extended stay in a reasonably nice nursing home could easily dissipate
the assets of the typical middle class household. Wise and Venti (1985)
examine the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances and report a median level of—6-
wealth of those households with household head age 55 to 64 of $55,000; among
households with head 65+ the median is $40,100. Most of this wealth is tied
up in real estate. For both groups the median level of financial assets is
less than $3,600.
The uninsured risks of nursing home care and other health expenditures
can not, of course, be assessed without considering the government's role
through Medicaid as a residual insurer. Indeed, for most of the 12.6 percent
of Americans with no medical insurance the government presumably represents
the insurer of first resort. In the case of high quality nursing homes,
middle class individuals seeking to insure access to such homes may only need
to save enough to cover the first year or so of a stay in a nursing home,
since they can, in many cases, become eligible for Medicaid and remain in the
same nursing home under Medicaid. Switching to Medicaid coverage of nursing
home stays is not, however, without its drawbacks. Medicaid patients in
private pay nursing homes typically have smaller rooms or must share their
room with another patient. They also loose some of their autonomy. For
example, Medicaid severely restricts the number of days one can be away from
the nursing home. Finally, once on Medicaid there is the possibility that the
nursing home patient will lose his or her bed because of a prolonged stay -in a
hospital. In this case the patient may be transferred to a much less
desirable nursing facility.
In sum -it appears that for at least most middle income and upper income
households future health expenditures represent a major uninsured risk. While
most health problems that do no involve prolonged use of hospitals and nursing
home facilities appear to be well insured, catastrophic or near catastrophic—7-
health problems may require and induce very substantial levels of precaution—
ary savings by middle and upper income households. For lower income house-
holds the availability of Medicaid in conjunction with the very sizeable costs
of medical care may make the option of relying on Medicaid preferable to
engaging in precautionary savings. Hence, for the better off segment of
society the high costs of medical care in conjunction with the lack of
catastrophic insurance may induce substantial additional savings, while for
the less affluent segment the high cost of medical care in conjunction with
the availability of Medicaid may be substantially lowering savings.
3. Modelling Precautionary Saving for Health Expenditures
A.Alternative Regimes
To understand how uncertainty with respect to health expenditures can
influence savings consider a simple two period life cycle model in which
individuals work when young and consume when young and old. There is no
population growth. In their first period when they are young individuals are
healthy; in the second period they become ill with probability P.If they
fall ill it costs an amount e to become well again. Whether of not
individuals who become ill choose to spend e and be cured depends on the
utility loss of not making the health expenditures as well as the availability
of insurance to help defray the health expenditures.
Consider first the "live with it" case in which individuals choose not to
have the cure if they become ill. Letting Cy denote consumption when young
and Co consumption when old, expected utility is given by:-8-
(1) EUa =U(Cy)+Pa13U(Co)+(1-P)13u(Co)
where 13 is a time preference factor, and a is a parameter whose value lies
between zero and one and determines the disutility from being ill. The budget
constraint for this problem is simply:
(2) Cy+RC0=W
where W is first period labor earnings, and R is one divided by one plus the
interest rate. The first order condition for utility maximization is:
(3) UI(CYa) =[Pa+(1_P)]13W([W_Cya]/R)/R
where is the optimal choice of Cy in this case.
Next consider the case of self payment in which the individual chooses to
have the cure, but must pay for it herself because there is no private




and the first order condition is:
(5) U'(Cy5) =PI3U'([W-Cy5J/R-e)/R+(1-P)$U'([W-Cy5]/R)/R
The third case to examine is that of private insurance. Assume that for
a total premium of vF, paid when young, the individual can purchase medical
insurance paying F if the individual falls ill. Expected utility with private
insurance IS:-9-
(6) EU1 =U(Cy)+PI3U([W—vF—CyJ/R+F-e)+(1-P)13U([W—vF—Cy]/R)
The first order condition for choosing Cy iS:
(7) U'(Cy1) =PU'([W—vF-Cy']/R+F-e)/R+(1—P)U'([W-vF-Cy']/R)/R
And the first order condition for the choice of F is:
(8) (1-v/R)PU'([W-vF-Cy']/R +Fe) =v/R(1-P)U'([W-vF-Cy']/R)
If the premium per dollar of coverage, v, is actuarially fair,
(9) v =PR,
and from (8) F =e;i.e., when insurance is fairly priced, the individual fully
insures. Equation (7) in this case becomes:
(7') U'(Cy') =13U'([W-PRe-Cy1)/R)/R
The last case to consider involves a government policy described here as
medicaid. If the individual becomes -ill the government pays for the cure, but
also confiscates all of the individual's assets. Medicaid provides the
individual with a level of old age consumption equal to C. Under medicaid
expected utility is determined by:
(10) EUm =U(Cy)+PU(ö)+(1—P)U([W—Cy]/R)
and the first order condition governing the choice of Cy is:
(11) U!(CYm) =(1_p)U1([W_CYm),R)!R
Medicaid health care payments and consumption payments for medicaid recipients-10--
are financed from medicaid's confiscation of assets of its recipients, i.e.,
(12) e +C=(W-Cy)/R
In this two period model the expected utility from self payment always exceeds
that under medicaid since the individual is effectively required to pay for
her own health care plus old age consumption, but the choice of old age
consumption when ill is predetermined by medicaid.
While medicaid provides no risk pooling in this two period example, it
does provide risk pooling in the 55 period simulation model of the next
section. In the 55 period model individuals may become ill in any of their
last 35 periods. The size of their assets that they surrender to medicaid
will depend on when they become ill. If they become ill early in life, their
assets will be small, and the value of medicaid payments for health care and
subsequent consumption will exceed the value of the assets that medicaid
confiscates. If they become ill when quite old, assets will again be small,
and medicaid will again receive less than it pays out. For those becoming ill
in middle age the assets the assumed compulsory medicaid program takes will
exceed the benefits medicaid provides. Hence, modeling medicaid as being
financed purely from confiscation of the assets of its recipients implies that
medicaid does not pool risk across the healthy and the unhealthy, rather it
pools risk, to some extent, among the unhealthy.
B. Savings Comparisons
Figure 1 is convenient for comparing savings in the four regimes. The
figure plots the function H(Cy) against Cy, where:—11—
(13) H(Cy) =RU'(Cy)—(l—P)13U'({W-Cy]/R)
which is clearly decreasing in Cy since U''<O. From equations (3), (5), (7'),





The right hand sides of (3'), (5'), and (7'') are positive. The right hand
sides of (3') and (5') are increasing in Cy. If U''' >0the right hand side
of (1'') is also increasing -in Cy. The right hand sides of these three
expressions are also plotted in Figure 1 adopting the assumption U''' >0.Note






From the diagram it is clear that consumption under medicaid exceeds that
under the other three regimes. Two other relationships are also immediate.
First, >Cy5,-i.e., consumption when young -inthecase the individualH (Cy)






Cy Cy Cy Cy—12-
chooses to "live with it" exceeds consumption when young in the self insurance
(self payment) regime, and second, Cy1 >CyS,i.e., consumption when young with
actuarially fair insurance exceeds that under self payment. Whether Cy1 is
larger or smaller than ca depends on the size of a, the term PRe, and the
degree of risk aversion. The diagram depicts the case in which >Cy',but
the curve representing the right hand side of (7'') could lie below that
representing the right hand side of (3').
Aggregate wealth held by individuals in this two period model equals only
the savings of the older generation, because the young have not yet
accumulated wealth. Since the savings of the elderly equals the saving they
did when young, wealth per young person, A, in the four regimes equals:
(15) Aa=W_CYa
AS =w - cyS
A1=W-Cy'-vF+vF=W-Cy'
Am =W-Cym
In the case of fair insurance the assets of the economy, A1, equal the wealth
of the elderly, W -Cy1
-vF,plus the reserves of the insurance company, yE.
It is clear from (15) that the larger is Cy the smaller is the economy's
savings. Hence, if U''' >0Savings is largest in the case of self payment
and smallest under medicaid, and the relative size of savings in the cases of
fair insurance and "live with it" depends on the specification of a, PRe, and
the degree of risk aversion. If U''' <0savings is largest in the case of
fair insurance, followed by savings under self payment, savings under "live—13—
with it," and savings under medicaid.
It may seem surprising that consumption when young with self payment
could exceed consumption when young with fair insurance, but there are two
offsetting factors involved in determining the extent of precautionary saving.
On the one hand the individual with no insurance is motivated to consume less
because of the possibility that he or she will become ill and need to pay for
the cure; on the other hand, there is the chance that the individual will not
become ill and, hence, will have the money that would otherwise have been
spent on the cure to spend on consumption. In this case the individual will
feel ex-post that she has oversaved. By consuming more now the individual can
reduce the extent of ex-post oversaving in the case of good health in old age,
albeit at the risk of greater ex-post undersaving in the case of bad health in
old age. If U''' >0the concern about saving too little outweighs the
concern about saving too much, and consumption -in the absence of insurance is
less than consumption with fair insurance.
Another case not yet considered is less than actuarially fair insurance.
One can show that starting at the actuarially fair value of v and rebating in
a lumpsum fashion insurance company profits that the choice of F will be
reduced as v increases. The derivative of Cy1, however, evaluated at the
actuarially fair choice of F and Cy1 equals zero. Hence, very small
departures from actuarial fairness, while inducing less insurance purchase,
will not alter Cy and, therefore, not alter savings. Larger departures from
actuarial fairness will, in contrast, affect Cy1 and savings. However, the
direction of this effect cannot be determined even assuming U''' >0.Of
course, if v is sufficiently large the optimal choice of F will be zero,-14--
transforming the insurance regime into the self payment regime. Hence, if v
-is increased sufficiently, Cy' will equal Cy5 which, assuming U''' >0,is
smaller than the level of consumption under actuarial fairness. Thus
sufficiently large increases in the insurance premium will ultimately raise
savings. It also appears possible that more moderate increases in the
insurance premium could be associated with savings in excess of that under
self payment. The simulations of unfair insurance in Section 5 illustrates
this possibility.
C. Choice of Regime
The choice of whether to I!live with it," to pay one's self for the
cure, to purchase insurance, or to rely on medicaid obviously depends on which
regime provides the greatest expected utility. The insurance regime dominates
self payment because one can't be worse off with the option of buying health
insurance. The self payment regime in this two period setting dominates the
medicaid regime, since the individual who falls ill is effectively forced to
purchase her own cure, is constrained -in her choice of consumption after
becoming sick. Thus, as modelled here, medicaid would only exist if it were a
compulsory program run by the goverment.
The choice of regimes depends on which offers the largest value of
expected utility, which depends, in turn, on the set of parameter values W, e,
a, and P.l As these parameter values change the optimal regime may switch,
producing abrupt and potentially significant changes in savings. To see this
lIt -is easy to show that the regime that is preferred ex-ante is also
preferred ex-post.-15-
take the case in which there are only two possible regimes, no cure and self
payment. Suppose that initially EUS >EUaand consider how savings is
affected by an increase in e. Provided EUS remains above EUa, CyS will fall
and savings will rise as e increases. At some point, however, the inequality
will switch, and the no cure regime will be preferred to the self payment
regime. At that point savings will drop, potentially quite sharply, since
>CyS.A similar discontinuity could arise with -increases in a that might
arise, for example, because of improvements in pain killers. WhileEU5 may
initially exceed EUa, as a rises EUa will eventually exceedEUS. When the
switch occurs saving will drop abruptly. Savings may also abruptly increase
either do to a fall in e or a or to a rise -inWstarting -inasituation in
which EUa exceeds EUS. Mote that as W increases EU5 converges to the case of
no health expenditure risk. The level of utility in the case of no health
expenditure risk obviously exceeds EJa.
4.Simulatingthe Savings Response to Uncertain Health Expenditures
A. The Simulation Model
Simulations of a 55
savings differences that
assumes that individuals
world age of 20) through
W. Between ages 45 and
individual is retired.
possibility of becoming
period life cycle model can provide a sense of the
might arise under the different regimes. The model
work full time from age 1 (corresponding to a real
age 45 (a real age of 65) earning a constant amount
55 (a real age of 75), the age of death, the
During the first 20 years of life there is no
iii. Beyond age 20 there is a P percent chance of-16-
becoming ill in a particular year given that one has not already been ill.
The illness, once cured, can not strike again. Illness occurs at the
beginning of the period. Once the illness occurs the sick have the option
either to purchase the cure or to remain ill. If they remain ill their
utility from consumption is multiplied, as above, by a, a parameter whose
value lies between zero and one.
The specific form of utility from consumption -in a particular year is:
(16) U(C) =
and,as above, there is a time preference factor i that discounts future
values of utility from consumption. The four regimes considered are "live
with it," self payment, insurance, and medicaid. In the case of insurance,
unfair as well as fair insurance arrangements are examined, with the premium
per dollar of coverage in the unfair insurance case set equal to 1.5 times
that in the fair insurance case.
The consumption choice problems in the four regimes can be solved with
dynamic programming. Consider first the case of self payment. At any age
above age 20 there are two types of individuals, those who have become ill
(either in the past or in the immediate period) and those who have not yet
become ill. Those who already have become ill can not become ill again and,
therefore, face no additional health expenditure risk. Those who have already





(18) Mk = R
Ck+i-17--
where Mk stands for the present value of resources at age k and equals the sum
of current assets plus the present value of future labor earnings. Let V(Mk)
stand for the indirect utility function for this problem. The indirect







The indirect utility functions Vk(Mk) can be calculated recursively using (19),





The case of no cure is quite similar. The indirect utility function for
those who have already become ill is:
(21) V(Mk) =avk(Mk)
And for those not yet ill the indirect utility function can be derived from the







Thecase of insurance -is slightly more complicated. Given the choice
of F, the amount of coverage, the appropriate recursion for indirect utility of




This analysis assumes that any profits made by the insurance company if
it charges an actuarially unfair premium are retained by the insurance company
and not rebated to the insured. This assumption is inappropriate to the macro
model since there are no seperate agents in the model who are owners of the
insurance company. A more appropriate assumption made below is that the
-18—
cl_y -
(24) V(Mk) =max + PVk+l([Mk_Ck+F_e]/R) + (3(1_P)Vl([Mk_Ck]/R)
k
(25)
The superscript F refers to the fact that the indirect utility functions of
those not yet sick is conditional on the level of F. Denoting by v the
premium payment made for lifetime coverage of F regardless of when one becomes
ill, the optimal choice of F, F*, satisfies:
(26) F*max V(M0-vF)
F
Thus to find the optimal choice of insurance coverage, F, one solves the dynamic
programming problem for all possible choices of F and chooses that value of F
yielding the highest initial (k=O) value of expected utility. In the case of
actuarially fair insurance the solution does not reguire dyamic programming,
since F is set equal to e in this case and the consumption path is derived by
maximizing U0 subject to the constraint that the present value of consumption
equals M0-vfF. where Vf is the actuarially fair premium. Note that Vf equals
the present expected value of the payment of one dollar at the time one becomes—19—
profits of the insurance company are rebated back to the insured as lump sum
payments. Since individuals view these rebates as lump sum, they will still
preceive that at the margin the price of insurance is actuarially unfair. The
rebate is calculated as the difference between the actuarially fair and unfair
premia on the coverage purchased. The optimal value of F is no longer
determined by (26), but by:
(26') F* =maxVJ(M -vF+r)
F
where r stands for the rebate and equals (v -vf)F*.Equation (26') suggests a
procedure for finding F*. For each possible value of F* one can form r and
check using the functions whether the candidate value satisfies (26'). If
it does, it is the true value of F*.
The last case to consider is medicaid. Once one has become ill, one goes
onto medicaid and is forced to consume C. Utility under medicaid is given by:
m
(27) Vk = 1—
j=O
The recursion for indirect utility for those not yet ill is:
C m








B. Calculating Aggregate Savings
In both the cases of no cure and self payment aggregate wealth just
equals the sum of the private savings of all individuals in the economy.
Since the population growth rate -is assumed to be zero, at any point in time
there is a fixed distribution of individuals of different ages with different
medical histories. For an individual who is age k, private wealth equals the
difference between labor earnings and consumption plus medical expenditures at
each age in the past accumulated with interest up through age k. Since
individuals at a given age will differ with respect to their medical
histories, and, therefore, their past expenditures, one needs to keep track of
all possible medical histories as well as the number of individuals in each
cohort with each medical history.
Aggregate wealth in the case of medical insurance equals the sum of
private wealth holdings plus the reserves of the stylized insurance company.
In this case private wealth is calculated by accumulating earnings plus
insurance payments plus the one time rebate (paid at age 1) less consumption
and medical expenditures less the initial payment of the lifetime insurance
premium. The reserves of the insurance company equal the sum of reserves on
the policies of each individual. While the sum of reserves is positive, the
reserves on any one policy can be positive or negative. The reserves on an
individual's policy equals the accumulated value of the initial premium, less
the initial rebate, less any insurance payments.
Adding up for this case, private wealth and the reserves of the insurance
company may seem a rather cumbersome calculation. There is, indeed, a much
simpler method of arriving at aggregate wealth. One can ignore the transfers—21--
to and from the insurance company and simply add together over allindividuals
in the economy the accumulated difference between earnings and consumption
plus medical expenditures at each age. This same method can beused in
calculating aggregate wealth in the medicaid economy. Alternatively onecould
calculate the wealth in private hands and add this to the medicaid trust fund,
which in the fully funded system considered here would have assets that equal
the sum of accumulated confiscated assets less accumulated medicaid payments
on C and medical expenditures. The assumption that the medicaid trustfund is
fully funded provides an equation to determine the value ofë.Ina fully
funded medicaid system the present expected value of payments to each
individual over his or her lifetime, including payment of the consumption
streamand the health expenditure e, equals the present expected value of
medicaid's confiscation of assets from medicaid participants.
C. Solution Method and Parameterization of the Model
It should be clear that there are not, in general, closed form solutions
to the dynamic programming problems outlined above. As a consequence, the
solutions to these problems were computed numerically. The technique here is
simply to calculate the values of the vk( )functionsfor specific grid values
of Mk. Since the calculation of Vk( )dependson the entire function Vk+1(
and not simply on particular grid values, one needs to interpolate values of
Vk+1( )fromthe calculated grid values.
Given the interpolated function ),thevalue of Vk for a particular
grid value of Mk is determined by finding, numerically, thevalue of Ck that
maximizes the relavant expression for Vk( ).Hence,as a by product of—22—
calculating the vk( )functions,one obtains optimal values of Ck for the
grid values of Mk. Interpolating across these values gives Ck(Mk) functions,
indicating approximately the optimal level of consumption. Clearly, the finer
the grid of values of Mk, the better is the approximation. For purposes of
this paper the fineness of the Mk grid was chosen such that increased fineness
would have only a trivial affect on the calulation of total wealth.
The Ck( )consumptionfunctions are then used in calculating the
economy's total savings. This calculation involves starting with a cohort age
1, deriving each possible lifetime consumption and health expenditure path,
determining the number of members of the cohort who will experience each path,
and then computing accumulated savings as just described.
In the base case economy y, the reciprocal of the coefficient of relative
risk aversion, equals 4, a value suggested by the empirical literature
(Auerbach and Kotlikoff,1987). The base case economy also features a 4 percent
interest rate and a 4 percent rate of time preference. Hence, both R and
equal 1/1.04. The value of M0 -is set equal to 100, and W, the yearly wage, -is
determined by the condition that the present value of earnings equals M0. The
resulting value of W is 4.64.
The value of e, the cost of the cure, -is five times W, or 23.2. The
probability of becoming ill in any year given that one is healthy, P, equals
.05. With these assumptions the actuarially fair value of a dollar of
health expenditure coverage, Vf. is 24.8 cents. Hence, in the case of fair
insurance total initial premium payments equal 5.75, almost 6 percent of the
present expected value of total lifetime consumption plus health expenditures.
The premium under unfair insurance is set equal to 1.5 times the fair insurance—23-
premium. For the case of "live with it," the valueof a is 1/2. For the case
of Medicaid, the value of C that Medicaid can finance from its assetconfisca-
tion is 2.25. The calculation of total wealth is based on a populationof
1000 in each cohort.
5. Simulation Results
Table 1 presents the values of total wealth f or the base case economy
under the different health expenditure regimes. The table alsoindicates the
seperate effects on savings in each of the regimesof reducing e by half and
lowering P to .01. As suggested by the fact that Li''' > 0 (in(16)) and by
Figure 1, base case savings for the case of self paymentexceeds that under
fair insurance, while base case savings is smallest for the caseof medicaid.
Savings under fair insurance also turns out to exceed thatunder the "live
with it" regime. Savings under unfair insurance slightly exceeds savings
-
underself payment. The amount of insurance coverage chosen in this caseis
7.00, less than one third of the cost of the cure.
The savings differences across these regimes are very substantial.The
introduction of actuarially fair insurance reduces savings by 12 percentif
the economy is initially in the self payment regime. If medicaid,rather than
fair insurance is introduced, savings is reduced by 80 percent! Alternatively,
if individuals opted to "live with it," savings would fall by 48 percent
relative to the self payment regime. These numbers would likely bereduced
quite a bit if general equilibrium considerations wereincluded in the
analysis, but even so they would remain quite large.
Wealth is so small in the Medicaid case because of the significant savingTable 1: Aggregate Savings Under Alternative Health Expenditure Regimes
Param
Regime Base Case Base
eterizat ion
Case,e=2.5W Base Case, P=.O].
Self Payment 1,008,670 869,710 1,136,140
Fair Insurance 891,521 828,212 822,061
Unfair Insurance 1,016,510 915,333 1,173,450
Live With It 527,017 527,017 682,301
Medicaid 222,062 325,871 626,383-24-
disincentive associated with Medicaid's asset confiscation. Quite simply,
this asset confiscation and Medicaid's provision of C make assets worthless
once an individual becomes ill; hence, the individual's need for assets in the
future is greatly reduced by Medicaid. This major saving disincentive from
asset confiscation would remain even if part of Medicaid's expenditures were
financed from general revenues, such as a wage tax.
In the "live with -it" regime individuals consume more when young relative
to the case of self payment because they know that if they become 111 their
marginal utility of consumption will be greatly reduced. Since 83 percent of
individuals ultimately become ill in the base case, there is a substantial
incentive to consume early in the "live with it" regime. One way of assessing
the sensitivity of savings in this regime to its perceived future value is
to determine the change in savings associated with lowering a from 1/2 to 1/4.
Savings in this case falls by 16 percent.
Since earnings is the same in each of the different regimes, any
differences in total wealth are due to differences in consumption levels and,
in comparing "live with it" with the other regimes, to differences in health
expenditures. Table 2 presents consumption levels at different ages for
individuals who have not yet become ill and for individuals who become ill at
specified ages. In the case of fair insurance, consumption always equals 4.10
regardless of age or the occurrence of the illness. This is because the
individual is fully insured and because the interest rate equals the time
preference rate. The consumption profiles for the other three regimes of
Table 2 are also flat up through age 20 reflecting the R =assumption; for











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































does not affect the marginal decision between consumption at different ages
prior to age 21.
tinder the self payment regime consumption grows after age 20 for those
remaining healthy, reflecting the fact that the extra precautionary savings
accumulated in case an individual had become ill in the previous year rather
than the future did not have to be tapped. In the last year of life, at age
55, the individual who remains healthy is able to consume an additional 23.2,
which corresponds to the amount that would otherwise have been spent on the
cure if the individual had become ill in his or her last year. If, on the
other hand, the individual becomes ill at a particular age after age 20, his
or her consumption immediately falls and stays constant at this lower level
through age 55 (again reflecting the R =assumption). For example, the
individual who is healthy at age 40 in the self payment case consumes 4.74,
while if she had become ill at age 40, her consumption would have been
only 3.87.
The consumption profile for those remaining healthy in the alive with it"
regime falls after age 20, reflecting the trade off between the marginal
utility of consuming today and the possibly lower marginal utility of
consuming tomorrow in the event one is ill. Once an individual becomes ill,
however, the consumption profile is flat because=R,and there is no
further uncertainty.
The Medicaid age consumption profile also declines after age 20, again
because of the lower expected marginal utility of saving another dollar
relative, for example, to the fair insurance case. Consumption prior to age
21 is highest under Medicaid, reflecting the lower marginal utility of saving-26-
for consumption after age 20 relative to the marginal utility of consuming
prior to age 20.
After the Medicaid regime consumption prior to age 21 is greatest in the
"live with it" regime. This reflects the fact that individuals will never be
making health expenditures and, hence, need not save for them. Note that the
present expected value of health expenditures, if they were made, is 5.75.
The level of savings is fairly sensitive to the size of medical costs and
4 1-t-.- 1 4.,-..I 11 L.- l ...L. _.....C.._J. — 1 LII p u I ue..om tug
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treatment leads to a 14 percent drop in wealth in the self payment regime and
a 9 percent drop in the fair insurance regime. In these regimes the reduced
incentive to save is offset somewhat by the reduction in health expenditures
in the determination of the net impact on savings. In the medicaid regime the
reduction in the cost of treatment, rather than reducing savings, raises
savings by almost one third. At the individual level the incentive to save
under medicaid is not affected by the reduced treatment cost; since medicaid
will pay these costs and since C is also under medicaid's control, the
tradeoff remains between current consumption when healthy and future
consumption when healthy.
While private wealth is not altered under medicaid by the reduction in e,
the size of medicaid's trust fund increases because the health expenditure
payments it must make are reduced. On the other hand, with a lower e,
medicaid can afford to pay a higher C. For the case of e=2.5W the value of
C-paid by medicaid is 3.00, 25 percent larger than its base case value. The
reduction in e and the increase in C, while leaving unchanged medicaidts
receipts from asset confiscations, pushes the timing of its expenditures
off into the future. A smaller e and a larger C means less medicaid payments—27-
at the time the individual becomes ill and more payments later in the
individual's life. The consequence of this change in the timing of medicaid
expenditures means that medicaid will have a larger trust fund.
Returning to Table 1 there are also some dramatic changes in savings that
arise from a reduction in P from .05 to .01. Wealth under medicaid almost
triples as individuals respond to the reduced probability of experiencing
medicaid's effective asset tax. The private incentive to save is also
strengthened in the "live with it" case; in this case the reduction in the
likelihood of becoming ill and having greatly diminished marginal utility from
consumption prompts a 30 percent increase in aggregate savings. In the self
payment regime the reduction in P reduces the need for precautionary savings.
Despite this fact there is a modest increase in wealth. This reflects the
reduced health expenditures. Relative to the higher P self payment case,
total cohort consumption plus health expenditures in the P =.01self payment
case is greater prior to age 21, smaller thorugh age 49, and greater
thereafter. Hence, the latter case has more 1-ifecycle saving among the middle
age (counting their health expenditures), although less among the young. The
increased saving occurring in middle age reflects the reduced health
expenditures.
A reduced P also means less health expenditures in the fair insurance
regime, but in this case the increased consumption of individuals more than
offsets this reduction in health expenditures leading to a somewhat lower
level of wealth. The lower P means a premium of 1.75 rather than 5.75 and
finances a higher level of consumption at every age. Hence the reduced saving
of the young outweighs the increased saving of the middle age (including their-28-
reduced health expenditures) and total wealth health expenditures) and total
wealth falls by 8 percent compared to the P =.05case.
One may summarize this table by saying first, that the changes in savings
down any column indicate that insurance arrangements and government -intervention
in the form of medicaid can significantly alter the amount of precautionary
savings and second, that the changes along any row indicate that holding
constant the saving regime, changes in the size and riskiness of health
expenditures can greatly influence savings.
Before concluding this section it may be useful to consider the level
of savings that would arise in this economy if there were zero probability of
the illness occurring. The answer is 758,878. This is almost a quarter below
base case savings under self payment and 15 percent below base case savings
with fair insurance. Intuitively the introduction of significant health
expenditures, whether insured or uninsured, shifts the age consumption
(including health expenditures) profile of each cohort towards more
consumption at later ages. This change implies more accumulated savings at
each age.
Since moving from an economy with zero health expenditures to one
depicted in column 2 of Table 1 in which health expenditures equal roughly 6
percent of total lifetime consumption could mean anywhere from a 33 percent
increase in savings to a 71 percent decrease in savings depending on the
chosen regime, it is clear that health expenditures are a potential critically
important determinant of savings.—29—
6. Conclusion
This paper has examined some of the theorectical issues involved in
precautionary savings for uncertain health expenditures. The highly stylized
simulation model gives the strong impression that uncertain health
expenditures represent a strong motive for saving, which may, however, be
greatly influenced by the availability of private insurance and the presence
of government programs such as medicaid. The model is too stylized to be
anything more than suggestive. More realistic modeling will require improved
estimates of the riskiness of health expenditures as well as better
understanding of the extent to which private insurance mitigates that risk.
A more realistic model should also consider the interaction of health
expenditure risk and earnings and lifespan risk. These risks are clearly
interdependent. Saving for future health care may become much more important
if one's earnings and, indeed, one's very life depends on receiving that care.
In this context, disability insurance, which represents earnings insurance in
the case of particular health episodes, may be having a very substantial
affect on precautionary savings.
Insuring the riskiness of lifespan, like insuring the riskiness of
earnings, appears to require special types of insurance related to health or
health expenditures. In the absence of uncertainty with respect to health
expenditures one could purchase annuities that would hedge the risk of living
longer than expected and not having sufficient savings. In the presence of
health expenditure uncertainty and less than full health insurance coverage,
fully annuitizing, the best option if only life span is uncertain and fair—30-
indexed annuities are available, becomes highly risky.If one is fully
annuitized and cannot borrow against future annuity payments, one will have no
resources to meet immediate uninsured health expenditures. Perhaps this is
why the private market in annuities -in the U.S. is virtually nonexistent.
Another issue in thinking about health expenditure risk and precautionary
savings is the role of the extended family in directly providing health care
as well as providing financial assistance for the purchase of health care. In
other contexts the family appears to constitute an excellent implicit
insurance market (Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981); presumably the same applies in
this context and, perhaps more so.
In sum, exploring the interactions of savings, health expenditures,
medical insurance, and other types of risks represents a very fertile and
apparently quite important area for future research.—31—
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